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INDIAN PROBATE: CAN AN ADOPTED INDIAN CHILD
RECEIVE TRUST PROPERTY AS AN "HEIR OF THE
BODY" UNDER AN INDIAN WILL?
S. Gail Gunning*
Indian probate is a colorful and complicated braid. The strands
of tribal, state, federal, and concurrent jurisdiction interlace
with ownership of restricted and unrestricted land, and again
with tribal membership, status, testacy, and intestacy. Through
it all run the variegated ribbons of ever-changing policy.1
The very concept of probating one's estate - of transferring
property to another - is a foreign concept superimposed on
Indian life by non-Indian law. 2 Communal ownership of personal
property and spiritual dominion over the land are widespread
Indian traditions. 3 The Indian is an inhabitant and steward of
the land, which no person can "own." No wonder "[m]erely
being involved in the research required prior to every Indian
probate produces frustration. That frustration, however, cannot
equate to the feeling of Indian clients bound by a conqueror's
court and laws not their4 own, especially when those laws conflict
with their traditions."

Adoption, unlike probate, is deeply rooted in Indian tribal
law and custom.5 In contrast, its origins in United States law
date only from the middle of the nineteenth century. 6 English
common law provided no foundation for adoption law in the
United States, since the first adoption statute in England was
not passed until 1926. 7 Indian traditions of adoption find little
harmony with current state adoption laws.8
© 1991 S. Gail Gunning
* Attorney/clerk, Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. J.D., 1991, University
of Oklahoma; B.S., 1975, Phillips University.
1. Petroskey, The Fundamentalsof Federal Indian Law, 65 MicH. B.J. 438, 438
(1986). The history of federal Indian policy can be divided into the following eras: PreConstitutional Precedents, 1532-1789; The Formative Years, 1789-1871; Allotments and
Assimilation, 1871-1928; Indian Reorganization, 1928-1942; Termination, 1943-1961;
Self-Determination, 1961-Present. Id. (citing F. ConaN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDILN
LAW 47 (1982 ed.)).
2. Vaznelis, ProbatingIndian Estates: Conqueror'sCourts Versus Decedent Intent,
10 Am. INDuN L. REv. 287 (1982).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 308.
5. Hallbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IowA L.
Rav. 971, 971-72 (1965).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 972.
8. Id.
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Nowhere is the braid of Indian probate more intricate than
around the modern-day adopted Indian child. The baffling combination of probate and adoption law, as applied to Indians,
often erodes the comfort and security the adopted Indian child
has found as an accepted member of a family and tribe. The
child's life is tangled into a confusing web. A strand-by-strand
unwinding of the elements of Indian probate and adoption law
will help to clarify the Indian adoptee's position.
This note will examine how the elements of Indian probate
and adoption law combine to answer the question of whether
an adopted Indian child can receive trust property under an
Indian will as an "heir of the body." This issue arose in the
Department of the Interior case of In re Estate of Frank (Tate)
Nevquaya Tooahimpah, Deceased Comanche Allottee 146.9
Indian Probate Jurisdiction
The strands of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction and law
intertwine in the plait of Indian probate. A pattern can be drawn
to delineate the conflict in Indian probate jurisdiction and choice
of law. The decedent, his domicile, his tribal membership, and
his property ownership all appear in the pattern. 10

9. Indian Probate No. IP OK 1 P 85-1, I.B.I.A. 85-22, H-33-71, H-34-67 (Sept.
25, 1990).
10. G. GARDNER, INDuN PROBATE LAW 20 (1986).
Indian Probate Jurisdiction
Decedent

Decedent's
Domicile

Indian

Indian Country

Property

Jurisdiction

Trust Propertyb
Real Property Outside of
Indian Country

Federal (exclusive)
State (exclusive)

Real Property In Indian

Non-Indian

Country
Personal Property

Tribal (exclusive)
Tribal (primary)

Trust Propertyb

Federal (exclusive)

Country
Real Property Outside of

Indian Country

State (exclusive)

Real Property In Indian

Tribal (primary)

Country

Possibly State
(concurrent)
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Tribal Sovereignty
The most basic principle of Indian law is that "those powers
which are lawfully vested in Indian tribes are not, in general,
delegatedpowers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished."'" Thus the powers of Indian tribes were born
with the tribes long before the advent of the United States
Constitution.
Federal Indian law regulates the relationship between Indian
tribes and the United States.' 2 Included are separate titles of the
United States Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, some 380
treaties, hundreds of opinions of the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior,
thousands of cases, and scores of law review
3
articles.'
Federal Preemption
The federal policy of preemption underlies the jurisdiction of
tribal, state, and federal governments.14 This policy grew out of

Worcester v. Georgia,5 wherein Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote that state law was preempted by federal power over6
Indians, in conjunction with the tribes' inherent sovereignty.
Myriad policy changes have led to the modern trend away from
the concept of inherent Indian sovereignty and toward federal
preemption of tribal law as well as state law. In McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission,'7 Indian tribal sovereignty
was relegated to the status of a "backdrop" for treaty and
statute analysis.

Personal Property

State (primary)
Possibly Tribal

(concurrent)
Non-Indian Anywhere

All Property

State (primary)

* Note that this does not include members of the Five Civilized Tribes or the Osage
Tribe.
bThe term trust property includes all trust or restricted property.
11. F. CossN, HANDBOOK OF FmERA INtmN LAw 122 (1971 ed.) (emphasis in
original).
12. D. GETCHES & C. WaLKINSON, FEDmA INDL&AN
LAW xxiii (2d ed. 1986).
13. Id.
14. Petroskey, supra note 1, at 441.
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Petroskey, supra note 1, at 441.
17. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

562;

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16

However, the limited sovereignty concept first stated by Marshall was reaffirmed in United States v. Wheeler. 8 "Indian tribes
are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory."' 19 The Indian probate
process clearly and unfortunately illustrates that "possessing
attributes of sovereignty" is a far cry from having sovereign
control over tribal members and property located within tribal
tenitory."

Indian Country
Federal Indian law determines jurisdiction in "Indian Country," which includes reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian trust allotments. 21 Jurisdiction over land in
Indian Country is determined by the land's status as trust (restricted) or nontrust (nonrestricted) property. Choice of law is
also affected by trust and nontrust status of the property. The

basic rule is that federal law controls the descent of trust property (which includes allotted lands), while state or tribal law
controls the descent of nonrestricted property.2
"'Trust property" is held in trust by the United States for the
24
benefit of an Indian.2Y Title is in the United States, as trustee.

18. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
19. Id. (citing F. CoHEN. HANDBOOK oF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (1945 ed.)).
20. Vaznelis, supra note 2, at 289.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988); see also Petroskey, supra note 1, at 441.
22. G. GARDNER, supra note 10, at 5. The notion of "discovery" provides the
foundation for the operative scheme, whereby the European "discoverers" gained the
power to define title to land and limit power - all without compensation to the Indians.
The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, assigned individual Indians
to parcels of land, on the theory that they would stop hunting and become farmers.
The balance of the land became public domain, open to homesteading. The notion of
assimilation was solidified by the regulation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The
enforced trust relationship took one hundred million acres out of Indian ownership
between 1887 and 1932.
Less than one hundred years ago, not one non-Indian owned any land in what is
now Oklahoma. Land was not the only loss. The Indian population has decreased from
twenty-three million to two million since the 1920s. Lecture by F. Browning Pipestem,
Attorey, University of Oklahoma College of Law (Sept. 13, 1989).
23. 43 C.F.R. § 4.201(m) (1988). Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831) was dismissed when Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the Court did not have
original jurisdiction, because the Cherokees were not a "foreign nation." Marshall set
forth important principles regarding the federal-tribal relationship. The Court described
the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" in a state of pupilage. The relation
of a tribe to the federal government was said to resemble that of a ward to his guardian.
From this statement arose the concept of federal trust protection. Petroskey, supra note
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Under the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, 25 a conveyance of trust
property from an Indian must be approved by the United States.
The Indian owner may not alienate trust property without the
consent of the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary's authorized representative. 26 Treatment of "trust property" and
"restricted property" is the same. 27
The original twenty-five-year trust term of the Non-Intercourse
Act was extended indefinitely by the Indian Reorganization
(Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934. 28 However, one avenue which
remains open to the assertion of tribal self-government is the
establishment of tribal
court jurisdiction over the nontrust assets
29
in an Indian estate.
In the estate of an Indian whose domicile is Indian Country,
tribal jurisdiction could include nontrust real property in Indian
Country as well as personal property 0 Where an Indian's domicile is outside Indian Country, tribal jurisdiction would depend
on whether agreements between the tribe and the state had
granted the state concurrent or primary jurisdiction.3 ' Current
federal policy seems supportive of such a division of jurisdiction
among federal, state, and tribal courts.3 2 The law and order
regulations for Indian reservations set forth the procedure for
determination of heirship and approval of wills in Courts of
Indian Offenses. 33 Thus a tribal court, or a combination of
tribal court and state court, could exercise jurisdiction over the

1, at 440-41.
"Congress' overriding purposes in enacting the General Allotment Act of 1887 were
to protect the Indians' interests in restricted land and to provide Indian allottees and

their families with permanent homes." Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44, 47 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388, 389-91
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)) (citation omitted). The act authorizes the
President to cause allotment of tribal reservation land "to each Indian located thereon
to be made in such areas as in his opinion may be for their best interest ...

U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
25. Id. § 177.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

43 C.F.R. § 4.201(m) (1990).
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988); see Vaznelis, supra note 2, at 291.
See Vaznelis, supra note 2, at 290.
See G. GARDNE R, supra note 10.

31. Id.
32. See Vaznelis, supra note 2, at 290.
33. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.31-32C (1989).
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nontrust assets contemporaneously with federal jurisdiction over
the trust assets in an Indian estate.
Testacy/Intestacy
The Indian Probate Act 34 provides the legal authority for the
descent of land, the ascertainment of heirs, and the disposal by
will of trust property. When an Indian dies owning trust property, jurisdiction lies with the Secretary of the Interior to determine the legal heirs of the decedent. 35 The determination of the
sufficiency of an Indian will is also under the jurisdiction of
the Secretary.3 6 The Secretary's jurisdiction over trust property
34. 25 U.S.C. §§ 371-373 (1988).
35. Id. § 372; G. GANnia, supra note 10, at 7; see also Blanset v. Cardin, 256
U.S. 319-20, 326-27 (1921) (upholding a Quapaw Indian decedent's devise of her allotted
land to her children and grandchildren instead of her husband; Congress intended
Indiams to have the right to dispose of property by will free of restrictions of state
law), see also Hanson v. Hoffman, 113 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir. 1940) (plaintiff claiming
a share of deceased allottee's estate as his blood daughter had no remedy under state
law; Secretary of the Interior had jurisdiction; decedent could will his property free of
state law).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 373 (1988); 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-.340 (1990). Hearing formalities
are provided in 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.230-36 (1990).
In Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44, 47 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Tooahnippah v. Hickel,
397 U.S. 598, 610 (1970)), an Indian widow challenged the determination of the Secretary
of the Interior that her Indian husband's will disinheriting her was valid. Although the
court: expressed its dissatisfaction with the state of the law, it found that the Secretary
was not free to disapprove the will merely on notions of fairness or equity. Id. The
sole limit on an Indian testator's freedom to devise restricted lands is the power of the
Secretary of the Interior to disapprove a will which is (1) technically deficient or (2)
irrational. Id. "[Ain Indian's devise of restricted lands is less restricted than an Indian's
(or a non-Indian's) devise of any other realty. He or she can will that property free
from any state law designed to protect a surviving spouse and there is no federal law
that fills the state law gap." Id. at 48.
In Atewooftakewa v. Udall, 277 F. Supp. 464, 466 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), the Secretary disapproved the will
of a Comanche Indian devising his allotted property. The Secretary's basis was the
failure to provide for an adult daughter born out of wedlock. Id. Examples given by
the court of rational bases upon which approval may be denied under 25 U.S.C. § 373
are lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, duress, coercion, undue influence, overreaching,
substantially changed conditions as to the decedent's heirs or estate occurring subsequent
to the making of the will, and improvident disposition. Id. at 468. The court pointed
out that it is incumbent upon the Secretary that he not lose sight of the fact that the
right to make a will has been conferred upon the Indian and not upon the Secretary.
Id.
The Supreme Court discussed the scope of the Secretary's power, as balanced against
the testamentary capacity of the Indian Testator. The Court stated that, in this case,
because the testator had testamentary capacity, was not unduly influenced in the
execution of the will, and complied with prescribed formalities, all questions were
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grants the additional discretionary power to cause trust lands to

be sold and the proceeds used for the benefit of the heirs or
beneficiaries.3 7 The Secretary may also remove restrictions, issue
a patent in fee (thus eliminating the trust status of the property),
or pay estate proceeds to the heirs or beneficiaries in whole or

in part from time to time as he deems advisable.38 Under the
Indian Probate Act, if the Secretary determines that the Indian

holder of trust or restricted land died intestate without heirs,
the land will escheat
to the tribe to which it belonged at the
39
time of allotment.

Choice of law is also affected by the testacy or intestacy of
the Indian decedent. If an Indian dies intestate owning trust
property, or if the federal administrative law judge disapproves
an Indian decedent's will, the judge will look to state law of
intestate succession in determining the heirs. 4° If an Indian dies
with a will which the judge approves, beneficiaries are determined under the will and federal law. 41 In Tooahnippah v.
Hickel,42 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Secretary's

authority and discretion do not allow disapproval of a will
"simply because of a subjective feeling that the disposition of
the estate was not 'just and equitable.'- 43

removed except the scope of the Secretary's power to approve or disapprove the will
under 25 U.S.C. § 373. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 607 (1970).
It cannot be assumed that Congress, in giving testamentary power to Indians respecting
their allotted property with the one hand, was taking that power away by vesting in
the Secretary the same degree of authority to disapprove such a disposition. Id. at 60809. However, the Court also pointed out that the right to dispose of trust property is
not absolute, because the allottee is only the beneficial owner, while the Government is
the trustee under 25 U.S.C. § 348. Tooahnippah, 397 U.S. at 609.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 373 (1988). "The Secretary may use his discretion to have the trust
restricted lands of a testator sold and the proceeds to be held or used for the benefits
of the entitled heirs, when to do so would be in their best interest, according to the
Secretary's judgment....
However, this provision has never been used by the B.I.A. Northern Idaho Agency.
The Agency holds that the title passes immediately upon the death of the testator;
therefore, the consent and/or application of the heirs is required before a sale of the
Indian land can be made." Naz PERCE JUDICIAL SERvIcEs, YouR INDIAN WILL: A WAY
TO KEEP RESERVATION LAND INDL-N (undated).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 373a (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 4.205(a) (1990).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 373a (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 4.205(a) (1990).
40. Estate of Victor Blackeagle, 16 I.B.I.A. 100, 102 (1988).
41. Hanson v. Hoffman, 113 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir. 1940).
42. 397 U.S. 598 (1970).
43. Id. at 610; see also W. Nutten, III, ProbateProblems of the American Indian,
7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 495, 497 (1972).
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Tribal Membership
Tribal membership is vitally relevant in Indian probate. Without tribal membership, one cannot hold the legal and political
status of "Indian." Tribal membership affects jurisdiction, in
that federal Indian probate statutes are not applicable for decedents who are members of the Five Civilized Tribes or the
Osage tribe. 4 Primary jurisdiction over probate for those
six
45
tribes is in the state courts of the State of Oklahoma.
Status
Several types of status are relevant in Indian probate. The
status of the decedent as an "Indian" is a legal and political
status, determined through recognition by the tribe and acknowledgment by the federal government 6 Status in regard to marriage, divorce, and adoption is determined by the state law,
47
tribal code or tribal custom effective in each individual case.
The validity of status is then subject to recognition or nonrecognition by the administrative law judge 4representing
the Sec8
retary of the Interior in a probate matter.
The status of an Indian child as "adopted" is determined by
the jurisdiction granting the adoption.4 9 However, the child's
inheritance rights are determined under the laws of intestate
succession of the situs of the land, while her right to disposition
of trust property by will is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Interior.5"

44. 25 U.S.C. § 375 (1988); see also G. GARDNER, supra note 10, at 18-20.
45. See supra note 44.
46. One may be an Indian by race and culture and yet fall outside the legal and
political classification. Most tribes have adoption procedures whereby one can be
admitted to tribal membership. However, the federal government bars one from taking
on the legal and political status of being Indian. The legal and political status of the
Indian tribes themselves is also subject to recognition by the federal government. Lecture
by F. Browning Pipestem, Attorney, University of Oklahoma College of Law (Sept. 13,

1989).
47. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1976) ("25 U.S.C. § 372a
manifests no congressional intent to "confer jurisdiction upon state courts over adoptions
by Indians. The statute is concerned solely with the documentation necessary to prove
adoption by an Indian in proceedings before the Secretary of the Interior.").
48. G. GARDNER, supra note 10, at 7.
49. Estate of Richard Doyle Two Bulls, 11 I.B.I.A. 77, 82 (1983) (cited with
approval in Estate of Victor Blackeagle, 16 I.B.I.A. 100, 102 (1988)).
50. Two Bulls, 11 I.B.I.A. at 82.
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Statement of In re Tooahimpah
In In re Tooahimpah, the decedent was an Indian allottee
whose will was approved by the Secretary of the Interior through
the administrative law judge. Had the decedent died intestate,
the recent Internal Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) decision in
Estate of Irene Theresa Shoots Another Butterfly, 51 would have
been applicable. As an adopted child, the court5 2 would have
ruled the claimant was an heir under federal law.
The decedent devised to each of his seven children a life estate
in a separate portion of his trust property. The will directed
that each remainder interest would vest in the "heirs of the
body" of each life tenant. The claimant was the natural-born
daughter of decedent's granddaughter. Her great aunt, one of
the decedent's daughters, adopted her.5 3 Thus the claimant's
present relationship to the decedent was that of adopted granddaughter.
Projected Decision in In re Tooahimpah
Can the adopted Indian child in In re Tooahimpah receive
trust property under the decedent Indian's will as an "heir of
the body"? Jurisdiction is the first determining factor in the
decision. The Secretary of the Interior clearly has jurisdiction
over In re Tooahimpah, because the Indian Probate Act provides
for exclusive federal jurisdiction over trust property, which includes Indian allotments.5 4 The death of an allottee does not
affect the trust status of the land, and trust property is not
51. 16 I.B.I.A. 214 (1988).
52. 25 U.S.C. § 372a (1988).
53. Partial family tree of decedent:
Decedent
/

/

/

Child

Child

Child

1

2

3

/

/

Child

Child

Child

5

6

4
AM

I

I

I

I

/

/
GM: Claimaint's Grandmother (Decedent's Daughter)
M:
Claimant's Natural Mother (Decedent's Granddaughter)
C-A: Claimant-Adoptee
AM: Adoptive Mother (Decedent's Daughter)
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 371-373 (1988).
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subject to tribal or state jurisdiction. 55 A division of federal
jurisdiction over trust property and tribal or state jurisdiction
over nontrust property in this estate might have been possible,
but it was not asserted. Therefore, sole jurisdiction lies with the
Secretary of the Interior.
Having established federal jurisdiction under the Secretary,
choice of law is the next factor to be determined. Where a will
exists, the allotment is disposed of under its terms, irrespective
of state law limitations.5 6 Where intestacy exists, the allotment
is disposed of under the state laws of descent and distribution.5 7
Thus the choice of law factor for trust property is determined
by the existence or nonexistence of a will. Authority for the
choice of law is provided in federal statues, federal regulations,
and federal case law. 8
The Secretary will look first to federal statutes, which provide
the threshold test for an adoptee to qualify as an heir of a
deceased Indian.5 9 The two basic requirements are that (1) the
adoption is valid under a state court decree, Indian court decree,
written approval and recordation by the appropriate agency
superintendent, or recognized tribal procedure; and (2) the adoption must be recognized by the Department of the Interior. 60 In
Tcoahimpah, the claimant's status as an adopted child was
determined in an Oklahoma state court and is thus eligible for
recognition by the Secretary.
Disposal by will of Indian allotments is authorized by federal
statute. 6' The validity of such disposal is decided under two
requirements: (1) the will must be approved by the Secretary of
the Interior, either before or after the date of death, and (2)
the will must comply with regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior. 62 In Tooahimpah, the decedent's will was approved by the Secretary after the date of death. Reference to
55. Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U.S 319, 325 (1921).
56. Id. at 326.
57. Id.
58. Hanson v. Hoffman, 113 F.2d 780, 789 (10th Cir. 1940).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 372a (1988).
60. Id. A problem also arises for the life tenant/parents. In Estate of Frank
Tooahnippah, 15 I.B.I.A. 258 (1987), the court held that where an Indian will creates
life estates in the decedent's children, with remainders to the life tenants' "heirs of the
body," no life tenant can receive oil and gas royalties from the property during life.
Such distribution requires the consent of all remaindermen, and the remaindermen
cannot be determined until after the life tenant's death.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 373 (1988).
62. Id.; see also Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U.S. 319, 323 (1921).
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the Code of Federal Regulations resolves the issue of whether
the will complies with federal regulations.
After looking to federal statutes to determine the validity of
an Indian will, the administrative law judge next turns to federal
regulations as the second source of authority. 63 In deciding the
issues of fact and law in a testate case, the judge shall (1)
approve or disapprove the will with construction of its provisions, and (2) decide the name and relationship of the testator
to each of the beneficiaries and describe the property each is to
receive. 64 The will in Tooahimpah had been approved. Thus, the
administrative law judge clearly has authority to construe the
will, based upon federal regulations.
The word "child" or "children" includes an adopted child
or children. 6 More specifically, there is an anti-lapse provision
for trust property devised to "lineal descendants or their issue"
- in Tooahimpah, the testator's children and their "heirs of
the body." 66 When a lineal descendant is to take under a will,
the "[r]elationship by adoption shall be equivalent to relationship by blood." 67 The key terms which emerge in this analysis
6
are "lineal descendants," "issue," and "heirs of the body."
Definition of the key terms requires reference to federal case
law, the third determining authority in the judge's decision. The
construction of Indian wills under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior is a question of federal law-not state
law-and is governed by decisions of the Interior Board of69
Indian Appeals and appropriate decisions of federal courts. 70
The testator's intent is primary in the construction of his will.
In Lipscomb v. District National Bank of Washington, D.C.,
the court based its decision on "internal evidence supplied by
the will taken as a whole." 7 1 It found an affirmative intent to
include adopted children in the terms "child," "issue," and
"descendant." 72 The court also considered the public policy
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

43 C.F.R. § 4.240 (1990).
Id. § 4.240(a)(2).
Id. § 4.201(k).
Id. § 4.261.
Id.

68. Id.
69.
Winona
70.
71.

Estate of Reuben Mesteth, 16 I.B.I.A. 148, 150-51 (1988); see also Estate of
June Little Hawk Garcia, 14 I.B.I.A. 106, 106-07 (1986).
Lipscomb v. District Nat'l Bank, 631 F.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id.

72. In Lipscomb, the beneficiaries included a home for unwed mothers and a home
for aged and orphans. The court interpreted these bequests as evidence of the testator's

generosity to persons outside the blood line whose situation was similar to that of his
granddaughter before her adoption. Id. at 1005-06.
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implications of the District of Columbia statutes passed by
Congress, whereby adopted children are accorded all the rights
of natural offspring. 73
Where the will itself fails to supply a reasonable intent, either
explicitly or impliedly, the court may be guided by public policy,
on the assumption that the testator would wish such an interpretation.7 4 Public policy can be determined partially from the
"unmistakable trend" in a number of jurisdictions to include
7' 5
adoptees in testamentary gifts to "issue.
It is unlikely that the decedent in In re Tooahimpah would
have wished to discriminate against his daughter's adopted child.
The adoptee was the natural-born child of the decedent's granddaughter and was, therefore, a blood relative. Had the claimant
not been adopted by her great-aunt, she would have remained

the great-granddaughter76 and lineal descendant of the decedent
through another child.
In addition to the probable intent of the testator, public policy
leans heavily on the side of according an adopted child all the
rights of a natural-born child. 77 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not yet expressly included an adopted child as an
"heir of the body.

' 78

However, since the passage of the Uniform

73. Id. at 1005.
74. Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
75. Id.
76. See supra note 53.
77. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why, 37 VArD. L. REv. 711, 738, 744 (1984) ("Until quite recently the prevailing
presumption was that when a person not a party to the adoption made a gift to someone
else's 'children,' 'issue,' 'grandchildren,' or other class of relatives, he did not intend
to include anyone not biologically born into the class." This is sometimes referred to
as rhe "'stranger-to-the-adoption' doctrine." The new presumption is pro-inclusion.);
Wheeling Dollar Says. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 504 (W. Va. 1977) (term
"issue of their body" does not show plain intent to exclude adoptee in view of statutory
presumption that "an adopted child is deemed a natural child unless a contrary intent
is plainly shown"); W. McGovmI, S. KuRTz & J. RmN, Wms, TRUSTS AmD EsTAT s
50-51 (1988) (citing In re Estate of Ogden, 353 Pa. Super. 273, 509 A.2d 1271 (1986)).
Anna Ogden's will created a trust for grandnieces and grandnephews; the share of any
who died was to pass to the "children of his body." This was held to include two
adopted children of a grandniece. The court said if the decedant wanted to exclude
adopted children she should have used clearer language. Ogden is more typical of recent
decisions.); Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 1985) (adoptee was issue of
deo.dent's deceased son in absence of limiting language in decedent's will).
78. See Mdore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266, 270 (Okla. 1967) ("issue of her body"
excludes adopted children). But see Estate of Ware v. Rector, 348 P.2d 176, 179 (Okla.
1958) ("heirs of my body" does not include adopted children; Oklahoma state law was
applicable because the decedent was an Osage Indian).
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NOTES

Adoption Act, 79 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Hines v.
First NationalBank & Trust Co." that unless the adopted lineal
descendants are specifically excluded by testamentary disposition, they qualify as beneficiaries and devisees under a will
leaving the estate to the ancestor's "issue." ' 8' In Estate of George
Green,82 the IBIA overruled at least one Oklahoma case which
restricted full family status in interpreting the meaning of the
term "heirs of my body" in a will.8

Although Oklahoma law may be an indicator of public policy,
it is not controlling. Not only are state laws of intestate succession non-authoritative, but state laws governing the construction
4 State law is
of wills also lack authority in Indian probate.
s
will.8
Indian
immaterial where there is an
While states are still split, more have ruled in favor of the
adoptees. 86 Equal inclusion of adoptees with natural-born
children has been called "typical of recent decisions." '
Certainly the strongest relevant indicator of public policy for
Tooahimpah is the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.88 Public
policy, as stated in the Act, is "to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote stability in tribes and families
...."89 Clearly this purpose is served by treating adopted ben-

eficiaries the same as natural-born beneficiaries, rather than
excluding accepted members of the family from class gifts.
The claimant in Tooahimpah is entitled to judicial review of
the Secretary's forthcoming decision, by virtue of her status as
an Indian with a claim to an allotment under an Indian will. 90
Had the decedent died intestate, the Secretary's determination
79. 10 OaA. STAT. § 60.16 (1981).
80. 708 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Okla. 1985).

81. Id. at 1080.
82. 1 I.B.I.A. 148 (1971) (court applied Oklahoma law in holding that the term

"heirs at law" in an agreement approved by the Examiner did not bar an adoptee from
pressing his claim for his proper share of the estate).
83. Estate of Ware v. Rector, 348 P.2d 176, 180 (Okla. 1958).
84. Estate of Reuben Mesteth, 16 I.B.I.A. 148, 150-51 (1986) (board applies federal
law concerning will construction when Indian executes will; therefore, neither state law

of intestate succession nor state law of will construction applies).
85. Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U.S. 319, 325 (1921).

86. See Rein, supra note 77, at 711, 738, 744; see also Wheeling Dollar Says. &
Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 504 (W. Va. 1977).

87. W. McGovwrN, S. KuRTZ & J.Rn x, supra note 77, at 50-51.
88. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
89. Id. § 1902; see also B. Levine, The Indian Child Welfare Act: FederalIndian
Law in State Probate Court Proceedings,65 MIcH. B.J. 453 (1986).
90. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 611 (1970).
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of legal heirs would not be subject to judicial review, due to
the "final and conclusive" language in the statute.9 1
In summary, the Secretary of the Interior clearly has exclusive
jurisdiction to render a decision in In re Tooahimpah, because
the real property is trust property and no other jurisdiction has
been asserted over the nontrust property of the estate. The will
was approved by the examiner. The will is to be construed under
federal statutes, under which the status of the claimant has been
satisfied by her adoption in a state court. Federal regulations
require that the adoptee/claimant be treated the same as a child
of the blood. In addition, the testator quite likely intended to
treat the claimant as an "heir of the body" of his daughter,
the life tenant. Public policy further supports the claimant's
position. For these reasons, the claimant should receive the trust
property under the Indian allottee's will as an "heir of the
body" of her adoptive mother.
Conclusion
The inconsistencies in Indian probate constrict the process.
The inconsistencies further raise the question of whether Indian
probate may be a dispensation of injustice. Why should a person
write a "will" and yet find its terms subject to disapproval by
those who are unfamiliar with the testator, his ways, and the
objects of his bounty? Why should a tribe, which takes responsibility for Indian land during a tribe member's life, see that
jurisdiction dissolve with the sale of the land or with the tribe
member's demise? Why should the Indian landowner, whether
an individual or a tribe, be "protected" out of the full rights
accorded other citizens of the United States? Why should the
original inhabitants and lovers of the land be forced to participate in the determination of its future "ownership" and yet be
limited in doing so?
Federal law has determined that Indians are competent to
write wills and that Indian tribes are competent to administer
the probate process for non-trust property. Why should a trust
relationship be found necessary for people of such acknowledged
competence?
91. Johnson v. Kleppe, 596 F.2d 950, 950-51 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Hayes v.

Seaton, 270 F.2d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp.
808, 815 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966); Tooisgah v. Kleppe, 418 F.
Supp. 913, 915 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Crawford v. Andrus, 472 F. Supp. 853, 854 (D.

Mont. 1979).
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NOTES

The Indian adoptee is bounced about from a number of
possible determiners of adoptive status to a "secure" home in
a family and tribe to another tug-of-war over her right to receive
property under a family will. That right is complicated by many
factors, including varying circumstances of property status, personal status, testacy, public policy, and, ultimately, the will of
government officials.
In spite of the complicated braiding of procedure and authority, the adoptee in In re Tooahimpah will probably receive
the property which is rightfully hers under the will of her
grandfather. But what of the next case and the next? Indian
testators and beneficiaries have a right to a less convoluted
process. In addition, the will of Indian testators, the rights of
Indian adoptees, and jurisdiction over Indian country rightfully
belong to Indian tribes. Indian probate is one braid which should
be unbound.
Addendum
A Department of Interior law administrative judge issued a
decision in In re Tooahimpah on September 25, 1990. The claim
of Debra Sue Pahdopony, nee Debra Sue Otipoby, was denied.
The judge stated that the words "of the body" are limited to
those born of the parent. He would have required a showing of
clear intent not to exclude either adopted children or spouses.
The author views the decision as a manifest injustice to the
claimant. The claimant has a right to appeal this decision to the
Bureau of Indian Appeals.
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